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REVIEW 
 
The Paradigm Sways: Macroeconomics Turns to History 
David A. Westbrook 
University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New York 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau.  The Euro and 
the Battle of Ideas, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 2016. 
 
Martin Wolf. The Shifts and the Shocks: What We've Learned -- and Have Still to 
Learn -- from the Financial Crisis. New York: Penguin Random House. 2014 and 
2015. 
 
Mervyn King. The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking, and the Future of the 
Global Economy.  New York. W.W. Norton. 2016.  
 
I.  Introduction 
 
These three books provide excellent analyses of the Global Financial Crisis and its 
second act, the Eurozone Crisis (jointly, the GFC).  In The Euro and the Battle of Ideas, Markus 
Brunnermeier, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau (collectively "BJL") show how the 
Eurozone Crisis reveals deep-seated and sometimes incompatible European traditions in 
economic policy.  They label the two approaches “French” and “German.”  In The Shifts and the 
Shocks, Martin Wolf uses the history of the GFC to analyze the global economy and highlight its 
vulnerabilities.  In The End of Alchemy, Mervyn King argues that the GFC challenged basic 
understandings of money and finance, and proposes fundamental banking reforms .  
 Given the magnitude of the GFC, new thinking might have been expected.  Historian of 
science Thomas Kuhn called the failure of an explanatory model, and the emergence of a new 
framework that better fits the data, a “paradigm shift” (Kuhn 1970).  These three books suggest 
that a paradigm shift may be under way in macroeconomics.  The new perspective emphasizes 
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historically based understandings in both economic policymaking and markets.  The emergence 
of such a paradigm would be an exciting development for the discipline.   
  
II.  The Euro and the Battle of Ideas 
 
 In The Euro and the Battle of Ideas, BJL chronicle the Eurozone Crisis as a clash of 
economic traditions.  They begin in 2010 with European efforts to respond to the discovery of 
financial stress in Greece.  European financial institutions and governments were highly 
leveraged and deeply interconnected, and currency devaluation within the Eurozone was not an 
option to manage the resulting strains.  The crisis in Greece became European in scope, and the 
European institutions and the Member States struggled to respond effectively.  Although a 
collapse of the Euro was avoided, economic growth remains slow and unemployment 
correspondingly high in much of the Eurozone, including Greece.    
 BJL observe that since the crisis the survival European project no longer seems 
inevitable.  According to BJL, Europeans differ in more than just language and culture.  
Europeans see the world itself, including markets, in fundamentally different ways.  Differences 
in economic worldview track national lines, which BJL schematize in ideal-typical form 
(borrowing from Max Weber) as "German" or "French."  During the general euphoria after the 
end of the Cold War, and especially the long bull market following the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, it was easy to paper over such differences.  But when Europe was forced to act to 
save its financial system, those differences in worldview became apparent.  Europeans struggled 
to agree on what should be done, which institutions could act, and who should pay.   
 According to BJL, the “German” worldview, shared by northern Member States, insists 
on strict repayment of sovereign debts.  The German approach favors the radical cutting of 
government budgets in order to be able to service such debts (“austerity”).  This position reflects 
not merely interests but an intellectual tradition, which BJL summarize in ten points as: 
 
1. a focus on legal, moral, and political foundations of free markets expressed in 
clearly articulated rules; 
2. a strong emphasis on responsibility and accountability; 
3. a concern with the potential for moral hazard arising out of lender of last 
resort activities; 
David A. Westbrook 
"Paradigm Sways" 
June 15, 2017 
 
 -3 of 13 - 
4. a concern that lender of last resort activities may corrupt monetary policy; 
5. a belief that binding rules are needed to shield monetary policy from fiscal 
dominance; 
6. a strict approach to government debt and debt ceilings; 
7. a conviction that growth is not achieved by provision of additional money but 
by structural reforms; 
8. a belief that present virtue -- austerity -- will be rewarded by future benefits; 
9. the view that net exports are a gauge of competitiveness and economic 
strength; and 
10. outside the Eurozone, a preference for flexible exchange rates with open 
capital markets.1 
 
 According to BJL, the “French” approach to financial crisis, favored by the southern 
Member States and most American commentators, is more lenient than the German.  French 
responses favor the restructuring of debt and some debt forgiveness.  French policy preferences 
are also grounded in an intellectual tradition, which BJL summarize in nine points: 
 
1. an understanding of rules as subject to politics, and therefore negotiable; 
2. a belief that crisis management requires flexibility; 
3. an assumption that constraining the freedom of government to act, and to 
borrow, would be undemocratic; 
4. a view of monetary policy as a tool to serve goals besides price stability, such 
as growth; 
5. the conviction that adjustment to international imbalances should be 
undertaken symmetrically, with surplus countries doing their part; 
6. the conviction that because multiple equilibria are possible, choosing an 
unpleasant trajectory for the present is likely to perpetuate rather than remove 
constraints on growth; 
7. the view that present virtue tends to be self-contradictory and self-defeating; 
8. an understanding of exports that are "too high" as indicating beggar-thy-
neighbor mercantilism; and 
9. the conviction that the international monetary system should be multipolar, 
and should include active management of capital flows to stabilize exchange 
rate movements.2 
 
                                                
1 Brunnermeier, James & Landau, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas, 66-67, 82.  The list is 
complete, but the text has been abridged and rephrased somewhat. 
2 Brunnermeier, James & Landau, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas, 74, 82.  Again, the list is 
complete, but the text has been abridged and rephrased somewhat. 
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 BJL set forth the polarities within European political economy with admirable clarity.  
Their book takes seemingly basic ideas and shows where they come from and how they establish 
habits of thought.  For example, BJL contrast the German federal constitutional order with the 
centralism of the French state.  For another instance, BJL point out that the German economy is 
based on middle-sized regional firms (Mittelstand), while the French economy is more reliant on 
large national firms ("national champions.")  As BJL explain, Germany has a long tradition of 
relatively collaborative relations between labor and capital.  On the other hand, labor relations in 
France have tended to be more confrontational French tradition.  Perhaps most importantly, BJL 
sharply contrast the German horror of inflation with the more tolerant French attitude.  
 Given such contrasts, one might think that the German and French positions are deep-
seated and permanently opposed. BJL show, however, that economic thought in Germany was 
once what is now thought of as French, and vice versa.  In the 19th and early 20th century, the 
Germans emphasized a strong state with great discretion to organize the national economy.  
Conversely, 19th and early 20th century French economic thought emphasized the freedom of 
markets from government interference (laissez faire).   
 As BJL explain, both traditions were transformed by the experience of World War II, and 
the Germans and the French essentially switched positions.  After the disastrous experience of 
the Third Reich, German economists looked to law and strict adherence to rules to prevent the 
state's abuse of power.  And, after the failure of the French Army on the battlefield, compounded 
by the Vichy Government's collaboration with the Nazis, French economic thinkers became 
much more concerned with establishing an effective state.   
 There is great irony here.  War between France and Germany was the initial impetus for 
what is now the EU.  The early architects of the European project hoped to create a different kind 
of politics.  At the same time, different understandings of World War II's historical significance 
have created different views of the state, law and rules.  And it is these different world views, 
schematized by BJL as "German" and "French," that have led to such deep dissension in coping 
with the Eurozone Crisis.  The same event that inspired the EU may prevent it from being fully 
achieved. 
 From BJL's perspective, the creation of a single currency under the Maastricht Treaty is 
simultaneously a great step toward European unity and the context for European conflict.  But 
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fundamental differences between "German" and "French" worldviews have tested the Maastricht 
framework.  When creating credible commitments by Member States to monetary stability, the 
Germans have emphasized rules, while the French have stressed the need for flexibility.  With 
regard to the "no bailout" clause, the Germans have insisted on the need for Member States to be 
liable for their actions, while the French have stressed the importance of solidarity.  When 
confronted with sovereign debt difficulties, Germans tend to see fundamental solvency problems, 
while the French see liquidity difficulties.   In perhaps the most pointed difference, the Germans 
believe true recovery from a crisis requires austerity, while the French favor stimulus. 
 BJL frankly admit that the original appeal of the European project has diminished, and 
new reasons for commitment need to be found.  In creating a new, more viable EU, the task is to 
steer between the Charybdis of a divisive nationalism and the Scylla of an alienating superstate.  
BJL have a number of practical suggestions.  Their discussion of trade flows within a currency 
union, their proposals for Eurobonds, and their ideas for European unemployment insurance all 
suggest possibilities for a revitalized European project.  But BJL provide only glimpses, and a 
more explicit argument would have been welcome.   
  BJL end their book on a hopeful note.  In some ways, they explain, the German and 
French perspectives are reciprocal.  They conclude: "the German view and the French view 
actually need each other to be sustainable."3  Neither the German nor the French economic 
tradition is finally right.  Instead, each view depends upon the counterbalance offered by the 
other.   
 In arguing that economic policy depends upon the state of play in a “battle of ideas” that 
cannot finally be won, BJL have taken a substantial step away from more deterministic notions 
of macroeconomics.  They argue that intellectual traditions and interpretations of history have 
motivated different responses to the Eurozone Crisis and therefore shaped the evolution of the 
EU.  In BJL’s account, historical understandings shape economic policy.   
  
III.  The Shifts and the Shocks 
   
 Martin Wolf begins The Shifts and the Shocks with a bold admission:  
                                                
3 Brunnermeier, James & Landau, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas, 390. 
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I lacked the imagination to anticipate a meltdown of the Western financial system.  
I was guilty of working with a mental model of the economy that did not allow for 
the possibility of another Great Depression or even a "Great Recession" in the 
world's most advanced economies.  . . . This book aims to learn from that 
mistake.4   
 
The Shifts and the Shocks is an enormous effort -- learned, insightful, and number-heavy -- to 
develop a deeper understanding of the global economy.   
 The book is organized in three parts: the first part is essentially descriptive, the second 
analytical, and the third prescriptive.  Wolf begins with "The Shocks": a description of the GFC 
that focuses on the weakness of the recovery in the high-income countries. He details what went 
wrong, along with tart commentary, and finishes with an account of how the GFC unfolded in 
developing countries. 
 In the second part of the book, "The Shifts," Wolf links the GFC to long-term historical 
developments. In considering the reasons for the crisis, Wolf is concerned especially with global 
capital flows.  Wolf describes three major drivers of the excessive liquidity leading into the GFC: 
emerging economies investing in developed countries; the cash generated by the oil boom in the 
early 2000s; and the search for yield in developed countries with low growth.  Beneath such 
turn-of-the-century shifts in the global economy, Wolf identifies more fundamental long-term 
shifts.  Wolf explores the ways in which liberalization and technology helped create global 
financial markets.  He documents the aging of populations, the rise of inequality and the lack of 
productive investment in developed countries.  Wolf presents the long-term structural shifts in 
the global economy as a gradual transformation of the international economic environment from 
a collection of nation-based systems into an interconnected global web.  Wolf then explains the 
GFC in that historical context.   
 As noted, Wolf finishes the book with a normative turn, "The Solutions."  In a virtuoso 
survey, he examines an array of macroeconomic thinkers, including Knut Wicksell, Friederich 
Hayek, Henry Simon, John Maynard Keynes, and Milton Friedman.  Wolf uses core insights of 
each thinker to analyze the GFC and explore ways to strengthen financial institutions.  For 
                                                
4 Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks, xviii. 
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example, he would like to see some version of narrow banking tried, at least as an experiment.  
Given the unlikelihood of such an experiment, however, Wolf discusses ways to make financial 
institutions more robust, including increasing capital requirements and macroprudential 
supervision.   
 Turning from financial institutions to capital flows, Wolf would like high-income 
countries to return to growth at pre-GFC rates, which he suggests would stabilize capital flows 
and hinder the buildup of imbalances.  In the hope of reestablishing growth, Wolf argues against 
austerity and in favor of debt restructuring.  He also argues for larger and more sustained fiscal 
stimulus.  Somewhat more radically, Wolf suggests that international capital flows should be 
more regulated to discourage risky flows of finance across borders.  Wolf would also like the 
IMF to take a larger role in ensuring against currency risk, thereby reducing the need for 
countries to self-insure through expensive foreign currency reserves.  He maintains that the 
development of a world currency in lieu of the dollar would not only be helpful, but incidentally 
would make U.S. monetary policy more nimble.  
 Wolf's conclusion, "The Fire Next Time," is pessimistic.  He points out that because 
responses to the GFC have been sufficient to contain the damage within seemingly acceptable 
limits, fundamental reform will not be undertaken without a more severe crisis.  Given that the 
imbalances he sees within the global financial system have not been rectified, Wolf expects such 
a crisis.  Wolf's pessimism did not abate after The Shifts and the Shocks was first published in 
2014.  In "The Long Goodbye," his supplementary afterword to the paperback second edition, 
Wolf summarizes the anemic recovery from the GFC and the modest lessons learned.  He ends 
with four concerns.  First, economies are excessively dependent on debt.  Second, the Eurozone 
is a failure but cannot be abandoned, and there is no clear way to solve its problems.  Third, 
"elites have failed and, as a result, elite-run politics are in trouble."5  Fourth, "the durability of 
contemporary globalized capitalism cannot be taken for granted."6  Wolf is pessimistic about 
global economic policy because, despite the GFC, policymakers are still operating on their old 
assumptions about how the global economy works.  
                                                
5 Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks, 382. 
6 Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks, 383. 
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 Wolf uses a broad scope of analysis, and considers matters outside the usual realm of 
macroeconomic discourse.  Like BJL, Wolf believes that economic decisions of actors such as 
banks and borrowers are informed by those actors’ interpretations of their historical 
circumstances.   For Wolf, the economy is not necessarily determined by objective factors.  The 
economy is social, and therefore the product of human understandings.   
 Wolf works to separate his "opinions about how the world works, which do change, from 
[his] values, which have remained unaltered."7  He describes his values as traditional liberal 
political economics, and attributes them to his father, a Jewish refugee from Austria in the 1930s.  
As it is for BJL, then, World War II is a foundational moment for Wolf.  His essentially 
traditional understandings of the roles to be played by states, the law, and individuals, however, 
cannot simply be segregated from the book as personal values.  Wolf’s fundamental structural 
assumptions sit in uneasy tension with his argument that we need new thinking about how the 
world works.  Such internal tensions make the Shifts and the Shocks all the more stimulating. 
  
IV.  The End of Alchemy 
 
 Two of Mervyn King's central arguments in The End of Alchemy illuminate some of the 
concerns expressed in The Euro and the Battle of Ideas and The Shifts and the Shocks.  Both of 
King’s arguments are based on the importance of time, and the ways that marketplace actors 
cope with the future.  The End of Alchemy argues that time, and the uncertainty it creates, is a 
basic aspect of markets.  Because that uncertainty is always present, institutions have been 
established to manage it. 
 King's first argument concerns the "alchemy" of the title: banks borrow in the short term, 
at low risk and low interest rates, and lend in the longer term, at higher risk and higher interest 
rates, and make money on the spread.  King contends that the maturity and risk transformations 
of banking are fundamentally lies.  High-risk long-term assets remain high risk.  There is no 
alchemy in the intermediation of banking.  When the economy is growing, the illusion works.  In 
a financial crisis, however, short-term liquidity evaporates as bank deposits or other short-term 
loans are withdrawn.  If a bank cannot acquire funding quickly, it fails.  Given the centrality of 
                                                
7 Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks, xx. 
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banking to society, the human costs of such a bank failure can be huge, as amply demonstrated 
during the GFC.   
 King puts pressure on Bagehot's teaching that central banks should serve as the lender of 
last resort to solvent but illiquid banks by lending at a penalty rate against good collateral.  King 
points out that, during a crisis, bank difficulties are usually presented as liquidity problems.  
Moreover, the value of complex assets that might be used as collateral may be impossible to 
determine.  Given the potential human costs, however, allowing the bank to fail may not be 
prudent.  Contra Bagehot's advice, central banks may provide liquidity to a bank that may be 
insolvent and without good collateral.  Those “bailouts” may then create problems with moral 
hazard, industry consolidation, and popular outrage. 
 King sympathetically considers the various banking reforms that were undertaken in 
response to the GFC.  He argues, however, that reforms to prudential regulation, systemic risk 
monitoring, and bank capital ratios are half-measures because they do not end the “alchemy” of 
risk and maturity transformation.  King also discusses various narrow banking schemes 
conditionally endorsed by Wolf, which would end the alchemy by requiring banks to hold liquid 
reserves in the amount of deposits.  In addition to difficulties with implementation, however, 
King believes that such schemes would restrict bank lending.  And restricting bank lending, even 
if it increased financial stability, would be bad for the real economy.  For King, the question is 
how to achieve a more stable system of banks capable of lending at a reasonable cost. 
 In response, King proposes transforming the central bank from a "Lender of Last Resort" 
to a "Pawnbroker For All Seasons" (PFAS).8  In times of crisis, the PFAS would stand ready to 
lend against collateral held by the banks at an appropriate discount rate.  Central banks, and 
ultimately taxpayers, would therefore not be at risk for bank bailouts.  Banks would have to 
decide, ex ante, on the basket of assets to be held as collateral.  The PFAS would decide, also ex 
ante, on appropriate haircuts for the collateral.  In other words, collateral would be "pre-
positioned" with the central bank.  Then, in the event of a liquidity problem, the PFAS could 
lend at short notice and with great confidence.  Finally, and crucially, short-term bank liabilities, 
including deposits, could not exceed the value of the liquidity the PFAS was prepared to provide. 
                                                
8 King, The End of Alchemy, 270.   
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 Deposit insurance diminishes the likelihood of bank runs because depositors know that 
their money is insured by the government up to some statutory limit.  In much the same way, 
King’s PFAS should make financial crises less frequent.  Depositors and other sources of short-
term funding would know in advance that banks had access to a specific amount of central bank 
funding if necessary.  That assurance would remove their motivation to withdraw their funds in 
times of crisis.  King's idea is fascinating, and deserves detailed and pragmatic consideration.9 
 King's second argument about coping with time seeks to recast our understanding of 
money, especially in and after crisis.  King begins with the proposition that the world is uncertain 
(as opposed to risky, understood as probabilistically quantifiable).  In particular, capitalist 
economies are uncertain because capitalism is good at generating technological innovation, and 
the emergence of new technologies is fundamentally unpredictable.  Future markets are therefore 
inherently unknowable, because actors cannot know what technological opportunities or hazards 
the market will comprise.  If future markets are unknowable, then it is impossible to make fully 
informed present spending decisions. 
 Money serves multiple functions, but for King its crucial function is as a store of value.  
Money enables its holder to make claims in the future.  Therefore, money "is not principally a 
way of buying 'stuff' but a way of coping with an uncertain future."10  Hence the old adage about 
saving for a rainy day -- we do not know the nature or the timing of the rain.  From this 
perspective, it is a short step to King's assertion that "in a capitalist economy, money, banking 
and financial markets are institutions that have evolved to provide a way of coping with an 
unpredictable future."11   
 King rejects the orthodox economics concept of "rational expectations" as a description 
of how uncertainty is managed.  He also rejects the insistence of behavioral economics on 
irrationality.  King describes a third option.  For King, people are fairly rational but they live in 
an uncertain world.  People therefore adopt rules of thumb, heuristics, to guide their decision 
making.  They estimate things like their anticipated lifetime income, and such assumptions, or 
                                                
9 A start has been made by Charles Goodhart.  See CAE Goodhart, "The Determination of the 
Money Supply: Flexibility versus Control," Financial Markets Group, London School of 
Economics. 
10 King, The End of Alchemy, 84. 
11 King, The End of Alchemy, 155 
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“narratives,” guide their current spending and saving decisions.  Like BJL and Wolf, King finds 
such assumptions to be informed by people’s understandings of history.  King is explicit: "The 
choices of narrative and heuristic do not constitute a general theory of behavior -- they are highly 
specific to particular historical circumstances."12 
 King points out that narratives may be revised.  People may learn that the narratives they 
have been using are wrong.  For example, when the economy is growing and credit is easily 
obtained, people may adopt spending rates that are unsustainable.  When the economy contracts 
and credit is withdrawn, people may replace their old narratives or income assumptions with new 
ones, and spend less.  For King, the slow recovery from the GFC represents not a deficiency in 
aggregate demand, but a narrative revision.  Due to the crisis, many people revised their 
expectations of lifetime earnings downward.  As a result, the context of their spending decisions 
changed, people spent less, and growth lagged. 
 According to King, different actors operate under different stories or narratives.  Based 
on those narratives, actors may experience the world as more or less uncertain and cause demand 
for money to rise or fall.  In this way, King imports individual historical understanding into the 
heart of economic activity.  "Traditional macroeconomics is the economics of 'stuff.'  We need 
instead the economics of 'stuff happens.'"13  King thus suggests an economics of reasonable 
actors in an uncertain world using money to cope with rainy days. 
 King's book represents a breakthrough. His understanding that markets are inhabited by 
reasonable actors in an uncertain world is quite different from the neoclassical presumption that 
market actors are rationally self-interested and operating in a world of calculable risks.  At the 
same time, King distinguishes his view from that of behavioral economists who rely on 
psychology to insist that market actors are not very rational at all.  For King, actors are fairly 
reasonable, or generally try to be, but they simply do not know what the future holds.  As actors 
tell and revise their stories about the future, their demand for money changes.  As a result, their 
willingness to spend or save changes.  King thus embeds people’s subjective expectations about 
an uncertain future, which are based on people’s individual interpretations of the past, into every 
monetary transaction.    
                                                
12 King, The End of Alchemy, 310. 
13 King, The End of Alchemy, 301-02. 
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V.  Conclusion 
 
 As each of these books shows, narrative understandings of history inform the actions of 
international institutions, governments, central banks, financial institutions, firms and 
households.  Such narrative understandings are not reducible to objective facts.  Instead, they are 
the subjective understandings of the past that economic actors use to make conjectures about the 
future.  Such conjectures about what the future holds, based on lessons learned from history, 
shape decisions about things like interest rates, investing, saving and spending.  In the 
approaches of BJL, Wolf and King, markets look less objective and efficient than classical 
economics has traditionally held.  Instead, economic actors depend on interpretations of history 
and individual experience, and make conjectures about the future.  Emphasizing historical 
narrative, as these books do, thus transforms economics by making it more subjective.   
 Such a fundamental change in a pattern of thought is what it means to have a paradigm 
shift.  If these three books are any guide, then macroeconomic policy may be taking a "turn to 
interpretation" similar to shifts in other social sciences in the last third of the 20th century.  This 
is a tremendous and exciting development.   
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